This paper studies equilibrium incentives in a vertically differentiated duopoly with price competition. We analyze one simultaneous-move game and two sequential-move games. In a simultaneous-move game, firms' managers determine their prices simultaneously in the first stage of the game and in the second stage two firms determine incentive schemes. One sequential-move game considers the case in...

We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg vot...

Consider a system M of parallel machines, each with a strictly increasing and differentiable load dependent latency function. The users of such a system are of infinite number and act selfishly, routing their infinitesimally small portion of the total flow r they control, to machines of currently minimum delay. It is well known that such selfishness if modeled by a noncooperative game may yield...

This paper studies contests where players have the ßexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals’ most recent effort in an intermediate stage. It is found that (1) contrary to previous Þndings, the Stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium. (2) There are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occuring on the underd...

It is now widely accepted that in many situations where classifiers are deployed, adversaries deliberately manipulate data in order to reduce the classifier’s accuracy. The most prominent example is email spam, where spammers routinely modify emails to get past classifier-based spam filters. In this paper we begin by modeling the interaction between the adversary and the data miner as a finite ...

The equilibrium network signal control problem is represented as a Stackelberg game. Due to the characteristics of a Stackelberg game, solving the upper-level problem and lower-level problem iteratively cannot be expected to converge to the solution. The reaction function of the lower-level problem is the key information to solve a Stackelberg game. Usually, the reaction function is approximate...

This paper focuses on the single-issue negotiation between Manufacture Agent (MA) and Material Supplier Agent (MSA) of the supply chain. MSA resorts to find partners to cooperate when it cannot finish the order independently. A two stage negotiation protocol is proposed. The cooperative game is combined with MA-Stackelberg game to resolve the negotiation problem. It is used to establish the coa...

Many modern critical infrastructures are cyber–physical systems that rely on the integration of physical processes and computational resources. While this enables advanced system diagnostics, monitoring, control, it also exposes process to cyber-threats. Critical such as nuclear power plants may be targeted by a variety threat agents, each with unique motivations, resources, capabilities. A Bay...

This work deals with subsidy transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer through the distributor in cooperative advertising. While the retailer engages in local advertising, the manufacturer indirectly participates in retail advertising using advertising subsidy which is given to the distributor, who in turn transfers it to the retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader; the distr...

This work is concerned with the application of game-theoretic principles to model competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power market. This market framework is presented as an alternative to the traditional vertically-integrated market structure, which may be better suited for develop...