The folk theorem characterizes the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium payo¤s of an undiscounted or discounted in…nitely repeated game with fully informed, patient players as the feasible individually rational payo¤s of the one-shot game. To which extent does the result still hold when every player privately knows his own payo¤s ? Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishm...

This paper investigates three models to implement Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) system with aid of game theory approach. In particular, the competition between thermal and renewable power plants is formulated in three models: namely cooperative, Nash and Stackelberg game models. The price of TGC is assumed to be determined by the legislative body (government) which is fixed. Numerical examp...

Among the most fundamental problems in Al-gorithmic Game Theory are those concerning the Nash equilibria of a strategic game: states where no player could unilaterally deviate to improve her utility. Such algorithmic problems, including their decision, search and approximation variants , have been studied extensively in the last few years. The fundamental theorem of Nash [4,5] that Nash equilib...

There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the status quo) and get payoff from their neighbors for coordination, it has long been known that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of this game is not 1, since the Nash...

We consider a barter market with multiple types of indivisible goods. Konishi et al. [J. Math. Econ. 35 (2001) 1–15] showed that the core of this market may be empty. We define a normal form game for this market and consider its equilibrium outcomes. Assuming separable strict preferences, we show that the game has a unique Coalition-proof Nash allocation. This Coalition-proof Nash allocation is...

An iterative procedure for the game of Matching Pennies is examined in which players use Nash’s map to respond to mixed strategies of the other players. It is shown that even though the game of Matching Pennies is a game with a unique Nash equilibrium point, the iterative procedure does not lead to convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In fact we find that if the game is played using this iterat...

We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this kind of equilibria. Then, we present a symbolic procedure that allows us to describe and estimate the number of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of an arb...

We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, each associated with a positive flow demand, and a load-dependent performance function for each network element. We first prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, considering two routing scenarios, namely when a user can ...

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymm...