We consider the Brownian market model and the problem of expected utility maximization of terminal wealth. We, specifically, examine the problem of maximizing the utility of terminal wealth under the presence of transaction costs of a fund/agent investing in futures markets. We offer some preliminary remarks about statistical arbitrage strategies and we set the framework for futures markets, an...

The bid /ask spread (inverse of liquidity) in turbulent financial markets—modeled theoretically—adjusts to market-makers’ average costs. Market liquidity declines (spread increases) with increasing absolute value of market-makers’ security inventories and volatility of security price and order flow.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal online mechanisms. This work generally assumes that the size of the market (number of bidders) is known a priori, but that the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the distribution of bid values. However, in many real-worl...

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-a...

Abstract We use generating functional analysis to study minority-game-type market models with generalized strategy valuation updates that control the psychology of agents’ actions. The agents’ choice between trend-following and contrarian trading, and their vigor in each, depends on the overall state of the market. Even in ‘fake history’ models, the theory now involves an effective overall bid ...

We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a “safe haven”) that provides agentspecific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter t...

a r t i c l e i n f o In this work we propose a simple market model where some features of the Specialist System are analyzed. In particular, the specialist's obligation to display bid/ask quotes on the book within the bounds imposed by the Exchange is considered. The proposed model allows to analyze the effects of the specialist's interventions on the short term dynamics of bid/ask prices and ...