Dissertation Abstract Chapter 1: Reclaim-proof Allocation of Indivisible Objects This paper studies axioms de…ning a " desirable allocation " in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are conditions of ex-ante robustness (individual-rationality and group-rationality) and ex-post robustness (Pareto-e¢ ciency) to blocking coalitions. We introduce an all-enco...

PV prosumers could have a significant contribution to the 20/20/20 goals, but the Dutch electricity system is not equipped for this. The current net metering policy has an uncertain future and net metering takes away the time dependent, system critical, component of the balance of demand and supply for prosumers. An integrated transaction cost theory and market design method is used to analyze ...

This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.

This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.

We envision a future economy where e-markets will play an essential role as exchange hubs for commodities and services. Future e-markets should be designed to be robust to manipulation, flexible, and sufficiently efficient in facilitating exchanges. One of the most important aspects of designing an e-market is market mechanism design. A market mechanism defines the organization, information exc...

Two basic market designs are used for the trading of electricity in meshed electricity networks with transmission constraints. Analytical results show that, in two-node networks, a market design integrating transmission and energy markets reduces the ability of electricity generators to exercise market power, relative to a design with separated markets for transmission and energy designs. In mu...

We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer’s profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading A...