In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has led to increased interest in the allocation of voting weights to member states with hugely differing population numbers. While the eventually agreed voting scheme lacks any strict mathematical basis, the Polish government suggested a voting scheme based on the Penrose definition of voting power, leading to an allocation of voting weights pr...

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreo...

A voting scheme constitutes an essential component of many fault tolerant systems. Two types of voters are commonly used in applications of real-valued systems: the inexact majority and the amalgamating voters. The inexact majority voter effectively isolates erroneous modules and is capable of reporting benign outputs when a significant disagreement is detected. However, an application specific...

We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size gr...

It is provably difficult (NP-complete) to determine whether a given point can be defeated in a majority-rule spatial voting game. Nevertheless, one can easily generate a point with the property that if any point cannot be defeated, then this point cannot be defeated. Our results suggest that majority-rule equilibrium can exist as a purely practical matter: when the number of voters and the dime...

A study on learning and decision-making methods was conducted by comparing an orthogonal methodology of manipulating data versus that of a majorityvoting procedure. The latter method has recently become popular in the literature involving applications such as pattern recognition. To evaluate the differences between the proposed methods, data from a multidimensional paradigm involving decisionma...

This paper presents a novel image thresholding algorithm, termed as random spatial sampling and majority voting based image thresholding algorithm (RMIT). RMIT firstly obtains a population of binary subimages by using random spatial sampling and Otsu’s thresholding algorithm [1]. Then RMIT aggregates these binary subimages into a consensus binary image by majority voting technique. Since the su...

This paper proposes a simple voting scheme for off-line recognition of handprinted numerals. One of the main features of the proposed scheme is that this is not script dependent. Another interesting feature is that it is sufficiently fast for real-life applications. In contrast to the usual practices, here we studied the efficiency of a majority voting approach when all the classifiers involved...

Define the predictability number α(G) of a tournament T to be the largest supermajority threshhold 1 2 < α ≤ 1 for which T could represent the pairwise voting outcomes from some population of voter preference orders. We establish that the predictability number always exists and is rational. Only acyclic tournaments have predictability 1; the Condorcet voting paradox tournament has predictabilit...

Real-time applications typically have to satisfy high dependability requirements and require fault tolerance in both value and time domains. A widely used approach to ensure fault tolerance in dependable systems is the N-modular redundancy (NMR) which typically uses a majority voting mechanism. However, NMR primarily focuses on producing the correct value, without taking into account the time d...