Abstract This paper will review important topics on the subject of auction theory and mechanism design, these include: efficiency first foremost, also revenue comparison between different types auctions issue incentive compatibility, individual rationality with general idea proof that bilateral trade is inefficient. Mechanism design tells us if buyers sellers both have private information full ...

This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible mechanisms in environments in which the agents’private information evolves stochastically over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we consider are fairly general in that the agents’types are allowed to evolve in a non-Markov way, decisions are allowed to a¤ect the type distributions an...

We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations. © 2007 Elsevier Inc...

Likes tend to match with likes. Supermodularity or increasing differences is a sufficient condition for unique assortative matching. This paper derives a necessary and sufficient condition, Local Supermodularity, which is satisfied for a broad class of economies. Establishing conditions for uniqueness is desirable for the purpose of incentive compatibility in the design of markets, and it guara...

This paper shows how process algebra can be used to automatically generate verifiable mechanisms for multi-agent systems wherein agents need to trust the system. We make the link between games and process models and then present an iterative algorithm allowing us to generate mechanisms as computer programs implementing given systems’ requirements, which are expressed as constraints and desirabl...

challenges to physicians – those with specific business interests as well as those whose sole focus is patient care. Understanding the law and knowing which, if any, of the many Stark exceptions apply to your arrangement is essential. Part I of this series explained the purpose of the Stark statute, how it differs from the anti-kickback statute and how you can determine whether it applies to ...

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences...