Let Z t,z be a R -valued jump diffusion controlled by ν with initial condition Z t,z(t) = z. The aim of this paper is to characterize the set V (t) of initial conditions z such that Z t,z can be driven into a given target at a given time by proving that the function u(, z) = 1 − 1V (t) satisfies, in the viscosity sense, the equation (2) below. As an application, we study the problem of hedging ...

Given an attracting periodic orbit of a system of ordinary differential equations, one can assign an asymptotic phase to any initial condition that approaches such a periodic orbit. All initial conditions with the same asymptotic phase lie on what is known as an isochron. Isochrons foliate the basin of attraction, and may have intriguing geometric properties. We present here two cases of a plan...

Heat equations with memory of Gurtin-Pipkin type (i.e. Eq. (1) with α = 0) have controllability properties which strongly resemble those of the wave equation. Instead, recent counterexamples show that when α > 0 the control properties do not parallel those of the (memoryless) heat equation, in the sense that there are initial conditions in L2(Ω) which cannot be controlled to zero. The proof of ...

where m is a (possibly vector-valued) unknown function of a real "time" variable t and an A-dimensional real vector "space" variable x. Here A is a linear operator, constant2 in t, operating on u, where u is considered a function of x alone (i.e., A acts on elements of a linear space (B and, for each value of t, u{-, ¿)G®). The function/is a known function of x and t. Thus u is to satisfy (1) f...

In this paper, we investigate a specific wave equation which generates the pre-Laguerre system, and prove that the pre-Laguerre system is related to the solution of the partial differential equation with some initial conditions. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of a core allocation, even if additional strong properties are imposed. We then introduce two top-coalition properties each of which gua...

for all z0 ∈ D(A). Here T (t) is the C0-semigroup generated by A. A system (1) that satisfies the above conditions will be denoted by Σ(A,C). The admissibility of C, eqn. (2), implies that we can extend the mapping z0 → CT (·)z0 to a bounded linear mapping from Z to L2(0,∞). We denote this mapping by C. Thus we have that for any initial condition z0 the solution of (1) is given by z(t) = T (t)z...

This study examined the effects of manipulating the size of groups of male student negotiators and their ability to communicate with one another in a game in which one player held veto power (i.e., had to be included in any winning coalition). The predictions of three models, the core, the value, and the weighted probability model, were tested. The game, in which the veto player could form a wi...

The observatton of a new type of perverse behavior of votmg rules-Brams and Ftshburn’s “no-show paradox”--led Mouhn to Introduce the Parttctpatton Axtom (PA) It requires that an elector’s failure to vote should never result m the election of a candtdate whom he/she prefers to the one elected tf he/she votes sincerely The present paper examines PA in the context of Condorcet-type conditions For ...