The paper proposes a formulation for generalized Nash equilibrium model which incorporates the strategic biddings of some consumers capable providing reserve and balancing services in day-ahead markets, respectively. bidding electricity market is modelled using bilevel optimization programming, where cost minimized at Upper Level (UL), energy costs clearing process are co-optimized lower level ...

We consider the problem of selfish routing in a congested network shared by several users, where each user wishes to minimize the cost of its own flow. Users are atomic, in the sense that each has a nonnegligible amount of flow demand, and flows may be split over different routes. The total cost for each user is the sum of its link costs, which, in turn, may depend on the user’s own flow as wel...

In this paper, a class of generalized general mixed quasi variational inequalities is introduced and studied. We prove the existence of the solution of the auxiliary problem for the generalized general mixed quasi variational inequalities, suggest a predictor-corrector method for solving the generalized general mixed quasi variational inequalities by using the auxiliary principle technique. If ...

Bagwell (GEB, 1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the slightest amount of imperfect observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirchsteiger (GEB, 1998) question this assertion: for any finite leaderfollower game, with arbitrary many players in each role and generic payoffs, they show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome which is accessible. That is, this outcome can be ...

We extend the classical transportation problem from linear optimization and introduce several competing forwarders. This results in a noncooperative game which is commonly known as generalized Nash equilibrium problem. We show the existence of Nash equilibria and present numerical methods for their efficient computation. Furthermore, we discuss several equilibrium selection concepts that are ap...