Computing optimal coalition structures is an important research problem in multi-agent systems. It has rich application in real world problems, including logistics and supply chains. We study computing optimal coalition structures in linear production domains. The common goal of the agents is to maximize the system’s profit. Agents perform two steps: i) deliberate profitable coalitions, and ii)...

Consider a game with a finite set of players. A coalition is a nonempty subset of the set of players. A coalitional game with transferable payoff consists of (1) a finite set of players, N (2) a function v : S ⊆ N −→ R. The value of the function for a given S, v(S) is known as the worth of the coalition S. v(S) is the total payoff that is available for division among the members of the coalitio...

This work shows that the formation of a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost to each coalition and the individuals’ common cost are all lower than in the corresponding nonatomic game (without coalitions). The individuals’ cost is lower than the average...

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We study the formation of a ruling coalition in non-democratic societies where institutions do not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternativ...

The Westminster model is recognized the world over as delivering strong, stable one-party government with hung parliaments an anomaly. The recent UK general election has proved the exception to the rule, with 2010 providing the first hung parliament since 1974. Unlike the 1974 minority administration, 2010 saw the formation of a coalition government for the first time in over 70 years. Bringing...

This paper reinterprets the γ -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may devia...

Soon after the Conservative-led Coalition government came to power in 2010, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi announced that Islamophobia had passed the ‘dinner-table test’ in contemporary Britain. Resultantly, the need to address Islamophobia was identified as a priority for the Coalition. This article critically analyses how the Coalition sought to achieve this and the extent to which it was successful....

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who ar...

Tackling the Computational Complexity of Understanding Coalition Formation in Multi-agent Systems, Andrew Dowell In its simplest metaphor, agent based computation is that undertaken via the interactions of autonomous computational entities (from [39]). Often, these interactions are cooperative and, in this context, a coalition describes any group of agents who may cooperate together. In any mul...