Evolutionary algorithms based on stochastic programming are proposed for learning of the optimum bid in auction markets. Sellers and buyers are attempting to learn their optimum bids that maximize their individual utility functions in the next round of the game. Examples of second-price sealed-bid auction and double auctionmarkets are considered and good performance of this type of algorithm is...

Dynamic auctions are trading mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices and efficient allocations based on price adjustment processes. This paper studies the computational issues of dynamic auctions for selling multiple indivisible items. Although the decision problem of efficient allocations in a dynamic auction in general is intractable, it can be solved in polynomial time if the econo...

For many immigrants, raising capital through conventional financial institutions (such as banks) is difficult, even impossible. In such circumstances, alternative institutions are often employed to facilitate borrowing and lending within the immigrant community. Using the theory of non-cooperative games under incomplete information, we analyze one such institution—the hu. i—which is essentially...

This paper analyzes bidding fee auctions, the recent auction format that is a nonstandard relative of the war of attrition. In bidding fee auctions, the prize value diminishes as the auction progresses, and the person who pays the most does not usually win. With over 300,000 daily visitors in the U.S. alone, bidding fee auction websites are an increasingly common way to shop online.1 In my samp...

To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equil...