Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent...

The paper studies a general model of hold-up in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modeled as an infinite-horizon non-cooperative bargaining game then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium will generally exist. The contract is robust in the sense that it does not depend on fine detail...

This paper is the first paper to present findings evaluating the consequences for employees of full and partial privatization using difference-in-differences combined with propensity score matching. We find: (1) partial privatization causes job creation in contrast to full privatization, which destroys jobs, (2) full privatization causes higher labor productivity improvement than partial privat...

Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent...

High performing nursing teams deliver quality safe care that is valuable to a country. In order to successfully perform tasks, there needs to be a proper mix of team composition in terms of team knowledge and team skills. Also, the team must work in a good surrounding through a positive team context. Team context, in the form of team identification and team support, provides the necessary work ...

Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement* The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and parties often prefer to use 'non-cooperative' implementation. We p...

We present evidence on the relative efficiency of U.K. university technology transfer offices (TTOs) using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier estimation (SFE). We find that U.K. TTOs exhibit low levels of absolute efficiency. Universities located in regions with higher levels of R&D and GDP appear to be more efficient in technology transfer, implying that there may be regio...

We present quantitative and qualitative evidence on the relative productivity of university technology transfer offices (TTOs). Our empirical results suggest that TTO activity is characterized by constant returns to scale and that environmental and institutional factors explain some of the variation in performance. Productivity may also depend on organizational practices. Unfortunately, there a...

Industrial buyer-seller relationships are frequently characterized by the fact that the seller and/or the buyer have to dedicate specific up-front investments to the relationship. Marketing research analyzes these relationships on the basis of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). TCE highlights the risk of hold-up which arises after specific investments are dedicated. However, exogenous uncertaint...

What determines the mechanism chosen to resolve a commercial dispute? To what degree does the aggrieved recover damages? And does the relationship survive in the aftermath? The answers to these questions affect expectations as to the costs of transacting and, thereby, the development of markets. But they have received almost no attention in the economic literature on the post-socialist transiti...