Sharing economy, a distributed peer-to-peer eco-nomic paradigm, gives rise to a variety of social interactionsfor economic reasons. One common distributed decision-makingprocess is the coalition formation to share certain replaceable re-sources collaboratively, for example, sharing hotel rooms amongtravelers, sharing taxi-rides among passengers, and sharingregular passes...

BACKGROUND Health plans and members benefit from the substitution of lower-cost drug therapies that achieve the same clinical outcomes as higher-cost drugs. Previous research suggests that generic sampling programs produce drug cost savings overall, but the effects attributable to acute therapies are unknown. Encouraging physicians to prescribe less expensive, first-line antibiotics may help re...

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy sharing enables prosumers within a community microgrid to directly trade their local resources such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, small-scale wind turbines, electric vehicle battery storage among each other based on an agreed cost-sharing mechanism. This paper addresses the cost minimization problem associated with P2P smart homes which are connected in residentia...

We study a multicast game in communication networks in which a source sends the same message or service to a set of destinations and the cost of the used links is divided among the receivers according to given cost sharing methods. Assuming a selfish and rational behavior, each receiving user is willing to select a strategy yielding the minimum shared cost. A Nash equilibrium is a solution in w...

In this paper we discuss a tag-based model that facilitates knowledge sharing. Sharing the knowledge incurs a cost for the sharing agent, and thus non-sharing is the preferred option for selfish agents. Through agent-based simulations we show that knowledge sharing is possible even in the presence of non-sharing agents in the population. We also show that the performance of an agent society can...

In the residual∗ cost sharing game with a convex technology, the equilibrium demands maximize total surplus, but total payment may differ from the actual cost, and a user with a null demand may be subsidized. If the cost function is totally monotone (e.g., polynomial with positive coefficients, or exponential), participation is voluntary and total payment covers actual cost. The ratio of excess...