This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our work generalizes the characterization of Roberts (1979) who showed that truthful mechanisms over unrestricted domains with at least 3 possible outcomes must be “affine maximizers”. We show that truthful mechanisms for co...

Transportation Network Companies employ dynamic pricing methods at periods of peak travel to incentivise driver participation and balance supply demand for rides. Surge multipliers are commonly used applied following estimates customer trip valuations. Combinatorial double auctions have been identified as a suitable alternative, they can achieve maximum social welfare in the allocation by relyi...

We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions involving a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets of items, i.e., for more than one unit per distinct good, that are expressed through their private valuation functions. Our objective is to determi...

A longstanding open problem in algorithmic mechanism design is to truthful mechanisms that are computationally efficient and (approximately) maximize welfare combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. The first such was obtained by Dobzinski, Nisan, Schapira [Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory Computing, Baltimore, MD, ACM, New York, 2005, pp. 610–618] who gave an -appr...