In this paper, an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier relationship; two firms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each firm writes a law-enforced contract to its privately-informed agent. The main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction between intra-firm (internal) contracting and inter-firm collusion may be exploited; inter-firm collusi...

Generic extensive form games of perfect information have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) show that in a stochastic evolutionary model also non-subgame perfect equilibriumstrategies may well survive in the long run. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of generic extensive form games of perfect information Hart (2002) shows that under suit...

In this paper we analyze the equilibria structure of k-price auctions, k G 3, under the independent-private-value assumption. We discuss agents with an arbitrary attitude toward risk. That is, agents may be risk averse or risk seeking, or they may have an alternating attitude toward risk. We provide a characterization of a continuous symmetric equilibrium, prove that there exists at most one su...

In many important high-technology markets, including software development, data processing, communications, aeronautics, and defense, suppliers learn through experience how to provide better service at lower cost. This paper examines how a buyer designs dynamic competition among rival suppliers to exploit learning economies while minimizing the costs of becoming locked in to one producer. Strat...

Abstract Background and objective: There are limited data on the clinical impact of Covid–19 in patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI). Aim this work is to assess infection mortality AMI admitted during national outbreak Italy. Methods Retrospective nationwide cohort study enrolling consecutive between March,11st May 3rd, 2020 (national outbreak) equivalent periods previous 5 years The...

The class of consistently competitive games canonically unifies Prisoner’s Dilemmas, contests, auctions, and Bertrand competitions. If those games are repeated infinitely, the players have to negotiate about the strategies that are to be repeated infinitely. These negotiations, however, are perturbed by the possibility that players make defective proposals (defective proposals are sensibly not ...

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depends on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this...

Delayed perfect monitoring in an in…nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player’s action choice with a …xed, but …nite delay. The observational delays between di¤erent pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria ...

We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at ea...

We investigate a linear state di¤erential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the …rms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental e¤ects of production in its objective function. If the market i...