This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that th...

For large-scale multimedia distributions, multicast is the preferred method of communication. ASM (Any Source Multicast) and SSM (SourceSpecific Multicast) are the two types of multicast used. ASM is designed for either many-to-many or one-to-many communication. SSM is derived from ASM. SSM is used when only one session member is allowed to send data. An example use of SSM could be an IPTV broa...

We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts which subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer–seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes; moreover, in contrast to results for the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, if any agent’s p...

We study many-to-one matching problems when each firm has substitutable and separable preferences. We analyze the stochastic dominance (sd) Nash equilibria of the game induced by any probabilistic stable matching rule. We show that a unique match is obtained as the outcome of each sd-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, individual rationality with respect to the true preferences is a necessary and su...

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