This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contras...

This thesis comprises three self-contained essays that deal with inefficient effort allocations in multi-task agency relations with moral hazard. The first essay analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibits task-specific abilities. Besides investigating the appendant consequences of applying incongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, this essay demonstrates that...

A smart contract, in form, is represented as a piece of computer program code involving related commercial transactions and algorithms. Essentially, this the computerization pre-agreed contract between participants. This special agreement automatically verified executed once preset conditions are triggered. Smart contracts not only used field financial transactions, but also include many aspect...

Degradation of land continues to pose a threat to future food production potential in many developing economies. Various approaches, mainly based on command-and-control policies, have been tried (with limited success) in the past to encourage adoption of erosion-control practices by farm households. High transactions costs and negative distributional impacts on the welfare of the poor limit the...

Ethereum is one of the first blockchains executing smart contracts (financial applications directly executed on ledger using a virtual machine). The performance machine has become bottleneck caused by high volumes transactions due to blockchain applications, including decentralized finance and non-fungible tokens. Hence, there need detail execution characteristics before its can be improved. Th...

This paper reports on a two-task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece-rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast,...

abstract the research and development sector in the pharmaceutical industry is very complex, and companies are constantly engaging in competition with each other for opening of their new products. in fact, the generic producers because principally have no research and development programs, are economically able to offer their products to the market with lower prices. finally, this difference in...

To guarantee delivery of their intended functionalities in the presence unresponsive parties, current smart-contracts cut users off from being able to commit responses after a fixed period time has elapsed. However, blockchains have limited transaction processing capacities, so amount will not always be sufficient receive every critical (C-TX). This paper presents mechanism for adaptive cutoffs...