1 HFAR Hospital das Foras Armadas, Azinhaga Ulmeiros, 1620-060 Lisboa, Portugal [email protected] 2 ALGORITMI Research Centre, Department of Information Systems, University of Minho, 4800-058 Guimarães, Portugal [email protected] WWW home page: http://www3.dsi.uminho.pt/pcortez 3 Business Research Unit (UNIDE-IUL), Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Av. das Forças Armadas, 162...

A class of signaling games is studied in which a unique Universally Divine equilibrium outcome exists. We identify a monotonicity property under which a variation of Universal Divinity is generically equivalent to strategic stability. Further assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Universally Divine outcome. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 021, 022, 026. ‘r 1990 ...

The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantiaily in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes, but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are sta...

The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic modeis where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes. but investment subsidies may become completeiy ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are sta...

We report a general theorem on sustaining cooperation in inlinitely-repeated games when the possibility of renegotiation constrains punishments not to harm both players. This result generalizes observations recently reported by E. van Damme (Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoner’s dilemma, L Econ. Theory 47 (1989), 206217) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Literature...