Many firms have more than one blockholder, but finance theory suggests that one blockholder should be sufficient to bestow all benefits on a firm that arise from concentrated ownership. This paper identifies a reason why more blockholders may arise endogenously. We consider a setting where multiple shareholders have endogenous conflicts of interest depending on the size of their stake. Such con...

this study addresses executive compensation from shareholders perspective by empirically examining the effects of chief executive officer (ceo) compensation on firm performance subsequent to the year of compensation. three factors of ceo compensation are examined, size, total annual compensation; form percentage of total compensation comprised of cash, cash bonuses and stock; and sensitivity. t...

This paper investigates the preferences of a firm’s current and future shareholders for the quality of mandated public disclosures. In contrast to earlier studies, our analysis takes into account the effect of the quality of public information on the firm’s internal investment decisions. We show that while the firm’s investment is monotonically increasing in the quality of public information, t...

In this paper the investment and liquidation policy of a levered firm is analyzed. The possibility of renegotiating the original debt contract is included. It is shown that the shareholders’ option to restructure the outstanding debt exacerbates Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem. This result is due to a higher wealth transfer from the shareholders to the creditors occurring upon investment ...

In Shamir’s ( ) t n , threshold of the secret sharing scheme, a secret s is divided into n shares by a dealer and is shared among n shareholders in such a way that (a) the secret can be reconstructed when there are t or more than t shares; and (b) the secret cannot be obtained when there are fewer than t shares. In the secret reconstruction, participating users can be either legitimate sharehol...

Article history: Received 17 June 2013 Received in revised form 9 December 2013 Accepted 8 April 2014 Available online 29 October 2014 Using data on China's split-share structure reform that floats non-tradable shares, we find that Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) have greater influence over the controlling state shareholders than localmutual funds. QFIIs are less prone to poli...