By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners’ dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma is often achieved, with ”recirpocal” preferences. In the chicken game a symme...

Computing a good strategy in a large extensive form game often demands an extraordinary amount of computer memory, necessitating the use of abstraction to reduce the game size. Typically, strategies from abstract games perform better in the real game as the granularity of abstraction is increased. This paper investigates two techniques for stitching a base strategy in a coarse abstraction of th...

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. On the basis of the information available to the players these games can be classified as follows: (a) partial-observation (both players have partial view of the game); (b) one-sided partial-observation (one player has partial-observation and the other player has complete-observation); and (c) complete-observation (both players have complete view...

We study partiality in propositional logics containing formulas with either undefined or over-defined truth-values. Undefined values are created by adding a four-place connective W termed transjunction to complete models which, together with the usual Boolean connectives is shown to be functionally complete for all partial functions. Transjunction is seen to be motivated from a game-theoretic p...

We model sequential, possibly multi-unit, sealed-bid auctions as a sequential game with imperfect and incomplete information. We develop an agent that constructs a bidding policy by sampling the valuation space of its opponents, solving the resulting complete information game, and aggregating the samples into a policy. The constructed policy takes advantage of information learned in the early s...

We propose conditions on games of incomplete information, under which solving the game reduces to solving a corresponding game of complete information. These games are referred to as scalable games. After establishing a link between (i) scalable games, (ii) games of complete information and (iii) games with strategy restrictions, we present two distinct applications. The first application demon...

OBJECTIVE The aims of this work were to determine whether game-based constraint-induced movement therapy (CIMT) is effective at improving balance ability in patients with stroke, and to provide clinical knowledge of game-based training that allows application of CIMT to the lower extremities. DESIGN Thirty-six patients with chronic stroke were randomly assigned to game-based CIMT (n = 12), ge...

Many refinements of Nash equilibrium yield solution correspondences which do not have closed graph in the space of payoffs or information. This has significance for implementation theory, especially under complete information. If a planner is concerned that all equilibria of his mechanism yield a desired outcome, and entertains the possibility that players may have even the slightest uncertaint...