This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate and form coalitions. The self-dualit...

Relaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage problem to arbitrary pose& we show after adjusting the notion of stability to the new problem that the set of stable marriages still forms a distributive lattice.

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down allocation is developed to create further insight in the local behavior of the weighted constrained e...

This paper defines a class of cooperative fuzzy games with infinite players, which is monotonically nondecreasing and continuous with respect to each player’s grade of membership. Then, the AumannShapley values for the games with fuzzy coalitions are proposed with the form of Choquet integral. The properties of the Aumann-Shapley values are also shown. Finally, the relationship between the fuzz...

In this paper, we extend our previous work where we have introduced the possibility of defining and using resources in ASP. In fact, in P-RASP (Resourced ASP with Preferences) one can define resources with their amounts. Available resources can be used for producing other resources, thus consuming either all or just a part of the available amount. The remaining amount, if any, can be used in a ...

The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning coalitions, in particular those coalitions a voter is decisive for. We present a new combinatorial formula how to calculate both indices solely using the set of m...