We study network formation with n players and link cost α > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of players to which v will become disconnected. We focus on unilateral link formation and Nash equilibrium. We show existence of Nash equilibria and a price of stabili...

For future dynamic spectrum access (DSA) systems, new spectrum management methodologies will be adopted such that the licensed primary spectrum holders can reallocate part of their available bandwidth to the unlicensed secondary service providers for profits, based on market-driven mechanisms. This is known as spectrum market or spectrum trading. This paper aims to propose a dynamic spectrum ma...

We consider resource allocation games with heterogeneous users and identical resources. Most of the previous work considered cost structures with either negative or positive congestion effects. We study a cost structure that encompasses both the resource’s load and the job’s share in the resource’s activation cost. We consider the proportional sharing rule, where the resource’s activation cost ...

An important goal of cooperative game theory is to understand how groups of selfish agents can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team’s profit is given by a convex function, and propose three profitsharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal ...

in this article, thermal stability of beams made of functionally graded material (fgm) is considered. the derivations of equations are based on the one-dimensional theory of elasticity. the material properties vary continuously through the thickness direction. tanigawa's model for the variation of poisson's ratio, the modulus of shear stress, and the coefcient of thermal expansion is...

A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this may matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. Theoretically the floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits, as low prices are excluded. However, be...

We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in [12]. This significant departure from previous work on the problem seeks to model Internet routing more accurately. We propose two models: the latency model in which the network edges seek to minimize the average latenc...

In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed framework decision-making entities are associated with individual transmission links, deciding on the way they split capacity among concurrent flows. An efficient d...

In this work, we investigated the stability of Molybdate-Phosphonic Acid (MPA) complex by density functionaltheory (DFT) computations in six solvents with the dielectric constant ranging from 1.92 to 10.36. The methodsare used for calculations are B3LYP and B3PW9 I that have been studied in two series of basis sets: D95nand6-31+G (d,p) for hydrogen and oxygen atoms; LANL2DZ for Mo and Phosphoru...

We consider congestion games in wireless sensor networks that offer quantitatively distinct classes of routing paths. Each routing class is characterized by a service cost. Within a routing class, the maximum link congestion is also an important metric for measuring the quality of the paths. Here, we study routing games where each player i selfishly selects a path with a respective routing clas...