Spectrum auctions are efficient mechanisms for licensed users to relinquish their under-utilized spectrum to secondary links for monetary remuneration. Truthfulness and social welfare maximization are two natural goals in such auctions, but cannot be achieved simultaneously with polynomialtime complexity by existing methods, even in a static network with fixed parameters. The challenge escalate...

This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance of a flexible packagebidding format developed by the FCC, in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the laboratory data; when value complementarities are present, package bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences a...

In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either maximize the social efficiency or maximize the revenue of the primary user. As the optimal conflictfree spectrum allocation ...

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several observers. In addition, the...

The radiofrequency spectrum is a valuable national economic resource. Efficient use of this resource is important to national economic well-being. National administrations have traditionally relied on a centrally planned model to manage spectrum. This has involved planning the use for parts of the spectrum at a national level, consistent with international conventions, and then issuing device s...

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses auctions to allocate radio spectrum frequencies to wireless service providers. The innovation of the auction design is that it o¤ers many heterogeneous licenses simultaneously in one ascending auction. This paper develops an empirical model and procedure to estimate bidder valuations. Given that the complex nature of the auction does not admit fo...

We introduce FAucS, a software testbed for studying automated agent bidding strategies in simulated auctions, specifically the United States FCC wireless frequency spectrum auctions. In addition to the complexity of these auctions, which provides ample opportunities for intelligent approaches to bidding, this type of auction has huge commercial importance, each bringing in billions of dollars t...

Recently, there is an urge to allocate chunks of the spectrum to the wireless service providers on a more dynamic basis rather than the current practice of static allocation. This shift in paradigm is a result of many studies that indicate the improper utilization of the spectrum by the service providers due to the static spectrum assignment. Also, the use of the spectrum has been found to be s...

One of the main reasons behind the concurrent increase in the demand for and congestion of Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum is the rapid development of radio networks of all kinds in our world, which has defiantly changed the public feeling about radio. Nowadays, almost everybody has a mobile phone and radio stations are literary everywhere. Someone can argue that our world is becoming a radio wor...

The concept of green payments together with single and multiple bidding processes for short-term spectrum auctions are compared based on two reference cases: (1) when the users and the auctioneer are aware of the value of the reserve price, and (2) when the value of the reserve price is known only to the auctioneer. This involves a novel concept known as the green payment. This concept is combi...