Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost assoc...

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We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighbouring district, there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village. When districts unite, under...

S | 155 Public Good Economics and Standard Essential Patents Christopher Yoo Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School Philadelphia, PA The smartphone and other similar industries have benefited immensely from the creation of technological standards. Adoption of an industry-wide standard can reduce costs, reduce uncertainty for firms wishing to produce components of the standard, provide...

We examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in contests in which groups compete to win a group-specific public-good prize, the individual players n choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently, and the probability of winning for each group depends on the groups' effort levels. In the basic model, we first show that, in each group, only the highest-va...

Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scope shrinks (expands). We ch...

We define a concept of share equilibrium for local public good (or club) economies where individual members of the population may have preferences over the membership of their jurisdiction. A share equilibrium specifies one share index for each individual. These indices determine each individual’s cost shares in any jurisdiction that he might join. We demonstrate that the same axioms as those t...

Deliberative democracy emphasizes a process in which political actors listen to each other with openness and respect, provide reasons and justifications for their opinions, and remain open to changing their points of view about public policy problems. Deliberators should be oriented toward mutual understanding, the goal of coming to some level of agreement, and should want to learn the reasons ...

In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies. More precisely, each agent’s income at the end of a period serves as her endowment in the following period. In this setting growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on cooperation levels. In stark contrast to standard public good exp...

We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multiplayer games, and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit, and present an analytical computation of spectral properties of fluctuations in multi-player public good games. This extends existing work on two-player games. In p...