Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Author(s): Salvador Barberá Source: International Economic Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 413-417 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research -Osaka University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/sta...

We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between di¤erent nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossiness is...

We study resource allocation in a model due to Brams and King [2005] and further developed by Baumeister et al. [2014]. Resource allocation deals with the distribution of resources to agents. We assume resources to be indivisible, nonshareable, and of single-unit type. Agents have ordinal preferences over single resources. Using scoring vectors, every ordinal preference induces a utility functi...

A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person’s report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategyproofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specifi...