The participation of private capital in public infrastructure investment projects has been sought by many governments who perceive this as a way to overcome budgetary constraints and foster economic growth. For some types of projects, this investment may require government participation in the form of project guarantees in order to reduce the risk of the private investor. As a consequence, the ...

This paper examines how public disclosure affects private information acquisition activity in a market economy. We analyze a setting where traders with short-term investment horizons are allowed to trade on their private information prior to a public disclosure. We demonstrate in this setting that public disclosure stimulates investment in private information acquisition. This result is shown t...

background and objectives: public-private partnership (ppp) is a well-established model to alleviate the risk of investment in health domain. while the model is widely applied in the developed countries, the adoption of the model in many developing countries is hampered partly by the lack of knowledge on dimensions and requirements of its local implementation. the present study, thus, aimed to ...

In a simple model, we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms’ research abilities are private information. This can be done with budget balance, even though there are participation constraints. There is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms’ payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities. ...

This paper suggests a solution to the puzzling finding documented in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) that the return to an index of private equity is equal to the return to the CRSP index of public equity even though investment in private firms is substantially riskier. It presents an occupational choice model where human and financial capital can be jointly invested in a private busines...

We study a duopoly model of investment, in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information, and possibly the experience of his rival. Investment costs are private information, and the background signal takes the form of a Poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low. The resulting attrition game has a un...