New functional representation for the strongly interacting systems is proposed which contains a new type of the coherent state. As a result the new algebraic structureso called ”tower of algebras” appears which gives the tower (or hierarchy) of models. 1 Functional approach. Consider Hubbard model (lattice version of Thirring model) [1]: H = −t ∑ ,σ αrσ + αr′σ + U ∑ r nr,↑nr,↓ = Hband = (1)

Econometric Causality This paper presents the econometric approach to causal modeling. It is motivated by policy problems. New causal parameters are defined and identified to address specific policy problems. Economists embrace a scientific approach to causality and model the preferences and choices of agents to infer subjective (agent) evaluations as well as objective outcomes. Anticipated and...

The paper describes a new evaluation measure for speech recognition in spoken language dialogue systems. The measure is based on the usefulness of the recognition for the system, and the usefulness is measured at the level of meaning representation. It is argued that the new measure is more useful than word error rate, and is more accurate than simpler functional measures.

Oxytocin is an evolutionarily highly preserved neuropeptide that contributes to the regulation of social interactions including the processing of facial stimuli. We hypothesized that its improving effect on social approach behavior depends on perceived sexual features and, consequently, on sexual orientation. In 19 homosexual and 18 heterosexual healthy young men, we investigated the acute effe...

A mathematical driver model is given in the spacial equation form, which takes into account the previewed information of the path. Optimal control method is considered for the ideal no time-delay case and Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional approach is applied to deal with drivers’ reaction time-delay. For both cases, exponential stability is guaranteed for the closedloop system.

This paper studies a principal–agent relation in which the principal’s private information about the agent’s effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient termination (firing the agent) or third–party payments (money burning). We show that money burning is the l...