نتایج جستجو برای: majority voting

تعداد نتایج: 186977  

2004
Vincent MERLIN

résumé – Les caractérisations axiomatiques du vote majoritaire et des classements par points. Le cadre arrowien de la théorie des choix collectifs est suffisament flexible pour entreprendre une étude axiomatique précise des règles de vote qui sont communément utilisées dans des élections politiques, lors de compétitions sportives ou par des comités d’experts etc. comme le vote à la majorité ou ...

2004
SCOTT L. FELD

The yolk, the smallest circle which intersects all median lines, has been shown to be an important tool in understanding the nature of majority voting in a spatial voting context. The center of the yolk is a natural 'center' of the set of voter ideal points. The radius of the yolk can be used to provide bounds on the size of the feasible set of outcomes of sophisticated voting under standard am...

2010
SALVADOR BARBERA

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].. Oxford University Press and The Review of Economic Studie...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2014
Klaus Nehring Marcus Pivato Clemens Puppe

Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice in which the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (‘views’) on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/no-issues. Yet, simply complying with the majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically inconsistent collection of judgements. Thus, we consider the Condorcet set: the set of logically co...

2004
Tarmo Veskioja Leo Võhandu

Providing centralised matching services can be viewed as a group decision support system (GDSS) for the participants to reach a stable matching solution. In the original stable marriage problem all the participants have to rank all members of the opposite party. Two variations for this problem allow for incomplete preference lists and ties in preferences. If members from one side are allowed to...

2013
Philippe E. Thomas Mariana L. Neves Tim Rocktäschel Ulf Leser

This work describes the participation of the WBI-DDI team on the SemEval 2013 – Task 9.2 DDI extraction challenge. The task consisted of extracting interactions between pairs of drugs from two collections of documents (DrugBank and MEDLINE) and their classification into four subtypes: advise, effect, mechanism, and int. We developed a two-step approach in which pairs are initially extracted usi...

2005
Hervé Crès Mich Tvede

A general equilibrium model with uncertainty and production externalities is studied. In absence of markets for externalities, we look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. Two observations leed the analysis: On the one hand, the shareholders with the right incentives for efficient internalization are t...

2018
Meshal Shutaywi Nezamoddin N. Kachouie

Due to advancements in data acquisition, large amount of data are collected in daily basis. Analysis of the collected data is an important task to discover the patterns, extract the features, and make informed decisions. A vital step in data analysis is dividing the objects (elements, individuals) in different groups based on their similarities. One way to group the objects is clustering. Clust...

2012
Rebecca B. Morton Marco Piovesan Jean-Robert Tyran

The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting by Rebecca B. Morton, Marco Piovesan and Jean-Robert Tyran* We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,”that is, result in groups making choices inferior to thos...

2015
Salvador Barberà Anke Gerber

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. We show that a well-known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our c...

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