This paper studies voting in corporate director elections. We construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 mutual fund votes over a two-year period. We find systematic heterogeneity in voting: some funds are consistently more management-friendly than others. We also establish the presence of peer effects: a fund is more likely to oppose management when other funds are more likely to oppose i...

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. In this paper we work with a more structured model that is suf...

PI: Jay Brunner, Vince Jones, Co-PI(2): Larry Gut, James Miller Vince Hebert Organization: Wash. State Univ. Organization: Michigan State Univ. Telephone: 509-663-8181 x238, 273 Telephone: 517-353-8648 & 509-372-7393 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Address: 1100 N. Western Ave., Address: 243 Natural Sci. Bldg. Wenatchee 98801 City/State/Zip: East La...

v. dannon showed that spherical curves in e4 can be given by frenet-like equations, and he thengave an integral characterization for spherical curves in e4 . in this paper, lorentzian spherical timelike andspacelike curves in the space time 41 r are shown to be given by frenet-like equations of timelike andspacelike curves in the euclidean space e3 and the minkowski 3-space 31 r . thus, finding...

We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a speci…c action. Our focus is on supplier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly di¤erent actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distribut...

Recent books by Carles Boix and by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson provide bold theoretical arguments about how economic inequality can undermine the survival of democracy. Many of their key assumptions, however, are called into question by existing research on “third wave” Latin American democracies. There is little evidence that the poor are more likely to vote for higher taxes or for le...

We propose a model that generates an economic expansion following good news about future total factor productivity (TFP) or investmentspecific technical change. The model has three key elements: variable capital utilization, adjustment costs to investment, and preferences that exhibit a weak short-run wealth effect on the labor supply. These preferences nest, as special cases, the two classes o...