In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consiste...

We present an algorithm that computes the structure of a finite abelian group G from a generating system M . The algorithm executes O(|M | √ |G|) group operations and stores O( √ |G|) group elements.

In this paper we examine the cardinal structure of inner models that satisfy GCH but do not contain 0. We show, assuming that 0 exists, that such models necessarily contain Mahlo cardinals of high order, but without further assumptions need not contain a cardinal κ which is κ-Mahlo. The principal tools are the Covering Theorem for L and the technique of reverse Easton iteration. Let I denote th...

In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignme...

We examine the mechanism design problem for a single buyer to procure purchase-options for a homogeneous good when that buyer is required to satisfy an unknown future demand. Suppliers have 2dimensional types in the form of commitment costs and production costs. The efficient schedule of options depends on the distribution of demand. To implement an efficient outcome, we introduce a class of me...