Abstract Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences things. Given this view, it is natural to think that our knowledge modality ultimately derives from Is view plausible? Do we genuinely have things, a form substantial enough ground knowledge? The more pack into notion essence allow underpin properties, harder claim genuine knowledge. I will argue realists about certain ...

This work is motivated by the existence of two useful but quite different knowledge representation formalisms, the situation calculus due to McCarthy, and the logic OL of only knowing due to Levesque. In this paper, we propose the logic AOL, which combines both approaches in a clean and natural way. We present a semantics for AOL which generalizes the semantics of OL to account for actions, and...

This paper out l ines an approach toward computa t i ona l l y invest igat ing the processes involved in reasoning about the knowledge states of other cogn i t i ve agents. The approach is Fregean and is compared with the work of McCarthy and Creary. We describe how the formalism represents the knowing o f intensional i nd iv idua ls , c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y , i t e r ated propos i t i...