Transfers within a Three Generations Family: When the Rotten Kids Turn into Altruistic Parents We study exchanges between three overlapping generations with non-dynastic altruism. The middleaged choose informal care provided to their parents and education expenditures for their children. The young enjoy their education, while the old may leave a bequest to their children. Within each period the...

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can occur even in the standard case in which individuals exogenously differ in risk only. We then extend the model to allow for both privately known risks an...

This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, each individual must have the incentive to abide by those norms, and so we investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. First, they act as conduits for transfers. Second, they act as conduits ...

Heterogeneously risk-averse individuals who lack access to formal insurance build and use relationships with each other to manage risk. I show that the composition of equilibrium relationships under pairwise matching and when group size is endogenous is determined by a mean-variance trade-o¤ across di¤erentially risky productive opportunities, though output distributions may have in…nitely-many...

Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual h...

We analyse how the welfare state, i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, should respond to increases in risks and to increases in the cost of operating the welfare state. With respect to risks, we distinguish between risks that can be insured and such that cannot (background risks). Insurable risks can be reduced by costly individual selfinsurance and by costly socia...

Insurance Policies for Monetary Policy in the Euro Area* In this paper, we examine the cost of insurance against model uncertainty for the euro area considering four alternative reference models, all of which are used for policy analysis at the ECB. We find that maximal insurance across this model range in terms of a Minimax policy comes at moderate costs in terms of lower expected performance....

In Absolute or Relative Terms?How Framing Prices Affects the Consumer Price Sensitivity ofHealth Plan Choice This paper provides field evidence on (a) how price framing affects consumers’ decision toswitch health insurance plans and (b) how the price elasticity of demand for health insurancecan be influenced by policymakers through simple regulatory efforts. In 2009, in order to...