Wang’s et al. article [1] is the first to integrate game theory (especially evolutionary game theory) with epigenetic modification of zygotic genomes. They described and assessed a modeling framework based on evolutionary game theory to quantify, how sperms and oocytes interact through epigenetic processes, to determine embryo development. They also studied the internal mechanisms for normal em...

F are increasingly relying on software to detect fraud in domains such as security, financial services, tax, and auditing. A fundamental problem in using detection software for fraud detection is achieving the optimal balance between the detection and false-positive rates. Many firms use decision theory to address the configuration problem. Decision theory is based on the presumption that the f...

PROFESSOR JEAN LEMAIRE: The two models I am going to present originate from game theory. They were devised as illustrations of game theoretical 'models to my operation research students. Game theory has not yet reached a point where it could be practically implemented in insurance companies. The first model I am going to describe is non-cooperative game theory. The second one uses utility theor...

In this paper we give a historical overview of the transition from classical game theory to epistemic game theory. To that purpose we will discuss how important notions such as reasoning about the opponents, belief hierarchies, common belief, and the concept of common belief in rationality arose, and gradually entered the game theoretic picture, thereby giving birth to the field of epistemic ga...

A family of replicator-like dynamics, called the escort replicator equation, is constructed using information-geometric concepts and generalized information entropies and diverenges from statistical thermodynamics. Lyapunov functions and escort generalizations of basic concepts and constructions in evolutionary game theory are given, such as an escorted Fisher’s Fundamental theorem and generali...

2 Main ingredients 5 2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2 Strategic-form games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Belief hierarchies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4 Type structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

In this document we provide a couple of exercises that help understand the basic concepts of game theory, including pure and mixed strategies, zero sum and non-zero sum games, and saddle-point and Nash solutions. The definition for concepts and the ideas for these exercises were taken in part from [1, 2]. Before we start, let us introduce some notation. We are going to assume that we have only ...

The concepts in game theory have been evolving in such a way that existing theories are recasted to apply to problems that previously appeared not to fit in. One of the most scrutinized concepts is backward induction. In extensive form games, given common knowledge of rationality, the outcome is backward induction. However, experiment results are contradictory from what game theory predicts. Se...

One of the central questions in game theory deals with predicting the behavior of an agent. Here, we study the inverse of this problem: given the agents’ equilibrium behavior, what are possible utilities that motivate this behavior? We consider this problem in arbitrary normal-form games in which the utilities can be represented by a small number of parameters, such as in graphical, congestion,...