Nowadays, serious games are present in almost every educational context. The current work deals with the design of serious games oriented towards getting transferable skills in different kinds of training settings. These games can be a valuable way of engaging citizens and workers in the learning process by means of metaphors or similar mechanisms close to their user experience. They also conta...

Random utility models have been widely used in many diverse fields. Considering utility as a random variable opened many new analytical doors to researchers in explaining behavioral phenomena. Introducing and incorporating the random error term into the utility function had several reasons, including accounting for unobserved variables. This paper incorporates fuzziness into random utility mode...

We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley-Shubik theorem on market games (1969), there might be a (fuzzy) game in which each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it i...

The Semivalues were introduced axiomatically by Dubey et al [7], as weighted values of cooperative games. For transferable utility games (TU games), they obtained a formula for computing the Semivalue associated with a given weight vector. Among the Semivalues are the well known Shapley value, Banzhaf value, and many other values, for different weight vectors. Let G be the space of cooperative ...

This paper introduces a new class of transferable-utility games, called multi-issue allocation games. These games arise from various allocation situations and are based on the concepts underlying the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O'Neill (1982). In this model, a perfectly divisible good (estate) has to be divided amongst a given set of agents, each of whom has some claim on the estate. Con...

In this paper we deal with the problem of extending the concept of nucleolus on fuzzy cooperative games. Described a newly invented definition of nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games. We prove that the newly defined nucleolus on the set of classical cooperative games coincides with the previously existing one. It is proved that for separate classes of fuzzy games the nucleolus exists and uniqu...

In this paper, we make a study of the Owen value for cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp case. An axiomatic system of the Owen value for fuzzy games with a coalition structure is obtained by extending the corresponding characterizations given by Owen. The relationship between the Owen value and the fuzzy core of fuzzy games wi...

A pure exchange economy generates a “market game” in which the allocations achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its members. Subject to certain regularity conditions, it is shown that for a market game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect uti...

In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TUgame is obtained by taking the Myerson graph restricted game and of that the Kamijo partition restricted game. In this game the dividend...