Screening contracts (or non-linear “menu of contracts”) are frequently used for aligning the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply chain parties are strictly (expected) profit maximizing and, therefore, sensible to even arbitrarily small pay-off differences between contract alternatives. However, previous behavioral work on contract...

U a consignment contract with revenue sharing, a supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product, and retains ownership of the goods; for each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier. In this paper we show that, under such a contract, both the overall channel performance and the performance of individu...

Because of payoff uncertainties combined with risk aversion and/or real options, farmers may demand a premium in order to adopt conservation tillage practices, over and above the compensation for the expected profit losses (if any). We propose a method of directly estimating the financial incentives for adopting conservation tillage and distinguishing between the expected payoff and premium of ...

We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder—the speculator—has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator’s expected profit equals zero. Nevertheless, the opportunity for resale can create a role for an active specula...

We consider the problem of making efficient qualitytime-cost trade-offs in collaborative crowdsourcing systems in which different skills from multiple workers need to be combined to complete a task. We propose CrowdAsm an approach which helps collaborative crowdsourcing systems determine how to combine the expertise of available workers to maximize the expected quality of results while minimizi...

A price-setting seller faces a buyer with unknown reservation value. We show that if the buyer is sufficiently risk averse, the seller can benefit from employing a Possibly-Final Offer (PFO) strategy. In a PFO, if the buyer rejects the seller’s initial offer the seller sometimes terminates the interaction. If the seller does not terminate, he follows up with a subsequent, more attractive offer....

We study the problem on optimal harvesting from a population in a stochastic crowded environment with harvesting cost. In this problem, the size of the population satisfy the stochastic logistic differential equation, which serves as a model for population growth in a stochastic environment with finite carrying capacity when harvesting is exercised. We consider the following problem: What harve...

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model in which (i) the rate of capacity utilization, the profit share, and the rate of employment are adjusted in the medium run, and (ii) the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of growth are adjusted in the long run. Both the Kalecki type and the Marglin-Bhaduri type investment functions are introduced. Using the model, we examine w...

This paper tests the hypothesis of market efficiency for the fixed odds betting market of Swedish trotting head-to-head matches. The hypothesis is carried out by a Wald test within a logistic regression model. Data support rejection of semi-strong efficiency at the 5 percent level of significance, while the weak form efficiency cannot be rejected. Moreover, evaluation of the simple strategy to ...