One-sided auctions are used for trading perishable agricultural commodities because their production cost is already "sunk." Moreover, the promptness and simplicity of one-sided auctions are beneficial for trading in perishable commodities. However, sellers cannot participate in the price-making process in these auctions. A standard double auction market collects bids from both sides of traders...

With the growth of electronic markets, designing double auction mechanisms that are applicable to emerging market structures has become an important research topic. In this paper, we investigate two truthful double auction design approaches, the Trade Reduction Approach and the Multi-Stage Design Approach, and compare their resulting mechanisms in various exchange environments. We find that com...

A key issue raised by previous researchers is the extent to which learning versus market structure is responsible for the high efficiency regularly observed for the double auction in human-subject experiments. In this study, a computational discrete double auction with discriminatory pricing is tested regarding the importance of learning agents for ensuring market efficiency. Agents use a Roth-...

This paper studies a variety of forms of regret minimization as the criteria with which traders choose their bids/asks in a double auction. Unlike the expected utility maximizers that populate typical market models, these traders do not determine their actions using a single prior. The analysis proves that minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking as the number of traders in the ...

At the University of Arizona, electronic trading (now commonly known as e-commerce) in the experimental laboratory began in 1976 when Arlington Williams conducted the initial experiments testing the first electronic “double-auction” trading system, which he had programmed on the Plato operating system. The term “double auction” refers to the oral bid-ask sequential trading system used since the...

Task offloading is a promising technology to exploit the available resources in edge cloud efficiently. Many incentive mechanisms for systems have been proposed. However, most of existing works study centralized under assumption that all mobile infrastructures are operated by central cloud. In this paper, we aim design auction-based truthful heavily loaded task system heterogeneous MECs. We fir...

Decentralised supply chain formation involves determining the set of producers within a network able to supply goods to one or more consumers at the lowest cost. This problem is frequently tackled using auctions and negotiations. In this paper we show how it can be cast as an optimisation of a pairwise cost function. Optimising this class of functions is NP-hard but good approximations to the g...

This paper studies the design of activity rules for a power exchange (PX). The suggested rules are summarized in Section 2 after their motivation is described in Section 1. They are developed in a practical form in subsequent sections, and collected together in Appendix A, along with several variants in Appendix B. Appendix C describes an alternative offer format that eliminates withdrawals. Ap...

We simulate a multiagent market with production, consumption, and exchange mediated by a sealed-bid double auction. Marked price bubbles and subsequent crashes occur when valuebased (fundamentals-driven) and trend-based traders are both present, and the market equilibrium price is ramped up exogenously. Similarly, negative price bubbles and recoveries occur when the equilibrium price is ramped ...

Different auction-based approaches have been used to allocate resources in Grids, but none of them provide the design choice for a specific economic model while considering the interest of all participants in the market. In this paper, we implement an auction-based framework for producer and consumer matchmaking in an ad-hoc Grid. In ad-hoc Grids, where the availability of resources and tasks i...