Empirical research in certain areas of environmental design and behavioural studies is faced with a credibility dilemma. This is because its area of investigation overlaps with public and professional experience but does not formally or adequately acknowledge this experience in its methodology. As a consequence many research outcomes while evidence based can often be blindingly obvious. An atte...

Two cases of evolutionary stable strategy with periodic payoffs are studied. The first is a generalization of Uyttendaele et al. The second is prisoner's dilemma with periodic payoff. It is shown that reducing the defection payoff by a periodic term is sufficient to introduce cooperation provided that the initial fraction of cooperators is greater than 0.6.

We present additional results for the alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma where each player can either cooperate or defect in response to the last move of the opponent. We recall that a cooperating player incurs a cost c resulting in a benefit b for the other player (0 < c < b). Hence, summing over two consecutive moves, if both players cooperate, each one receives a payoff of b − c ; if both defect...

Prisoner’s dilemma has been heavily studied. In classical model, each player chooses to either ”Cooperate” or ”Defect”. In this paper, we generalize the prisoner’s dilemma with a new alternative which is neither defect or cooperation. The classical model is the special case under the condition that the third state is not taken into consideration.

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game between siblings.

Many moral psychologists have proposed that the difference between people’s moral judgments about the Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas can be explained by their differing emotional responses to the dilemmas. In two experiments, we tested this explanation by presenting the dilemmas and measuring participants’ reactions using a self-report emotion measure (PANAS-X). As might be expected, participa...

The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payo¤s. Likewise, a prisoners’ dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavi...

A notion of π-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines ε-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that π-tolerant equilibrium can explain cooperation in social dilemmas such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good game. We then examine the structure of particularly...