Instability, proxied by individual level data on satisfaction, is measured, its association with inequality is investigated, and the socio-economic determinants of overall satisfaction are modelled. A very recent national representative household survey (2002) with a module designed to serve this purpose has been the statistics source of this study. The results point to the role of income growt...

This paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With su¢ cient inequalit...

This paper studies the problem of providing multiple public goods for agents with single-peaked preferences. A decision rule selects m points for the m identical public goods for every pro le of reported preferences. In Miyagawa (1998c) these multiple public goods are options, i.e., alternatives are compared by the most preferred goods according to the agents' preferences. In this paper agents ...

Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models differ in the probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set...

A perceived advantage of cap-and-trade programs over more prescriptive environmental regulation is that enhanced compliance flexibility and cost effectiveness can make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible. However, increased compliance flexibility can also result in an inequitable distribution of pollution. We investigate these issues in the context of Southern California’s ...

This paper analyses alternative ‘regimes’ (i.e. profiles of opportunity sets for individuals) for an exchange economy, without assuming that individuals act on coherent preferences. A Strong Opportunity Criterion is proposed. This extends the requirements of McQuillin and Sugden’s (2012) Opportunity Criterion to every set of individuals in an economy. The concept of a ‘market-clearing single-pr...

While recent research on income polarization is based on only a few approaches, this paper portrays the major methods and applies each to income distributions of Germany (1984-2000) and the US (1984-1997) using the Cross-National Equivalent Files. In addition, statistical inference is provided via bootstrap techniques. Further, we combine kernel density estimation with a unimodality test. The e...

For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a va...

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it an O...

This paper analyses the extent of income inequality and opportunity inequality in 25 European countries. The present work contributes to understanding the origin of standard income inequality, helping to identify potential institutional setups that are associated to opportunity inequality. We distinguish between ex ante and ex post opportunity inequality. We find that ex ante equality of opport...