Why do developing countries prove so resistant to the rule of law? The problem is all the more paradoxical because the institutional technologies for providing the rule of law – systems of property rights, civil rights, and personal liberties, general incorporation laws, corporate governance structures, contract law, and judicial systems – is relatively well-known. To address these questions, I...

We contribute to a growing focus on variation in diffusion processes by examining the ways in which contested practices are modified as they spread among adopters. Expanding on prior diffusion accounts, we argue that the extensiveness and similarity of a practice will vary in response to both populationand organization-level mechanisms. To examine these issues, we study variation in “golden par...

This study addresses various deficiencies in the corporate governance and intellectual capital literature by examining the association between the level of gender and ethnic diversity on the boards of directors of South African publicly listed firms and their degree of intellectual capital performance. A total of eighty-four South African publicly listed firms were included in this study. Empir...

.................................................................................... viii CHAPTER

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of nonSOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance i...

The notion that good corporate governance means maximizing shareholder value derives from the neoclassical theory of the market economy. I explain why this perspective is highly problematic for understanding the operation and performance of the business corporation and hence the institutions that, for the sake of economic development, should govern it. The main problem is that the market-econom...

A manager’s shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A rich literature has documented that this insight has profound implications for corporate governance because assessment generates incentives (good and bad), introduces assorted risks, and affects the various battles that rage among the relevant actors for corporate control. Conse...