This paper examines whether historical wealth distributions can affect long run output and distribution despite rational saving behavior and the absence of any technological nonconvexities or externalities. We consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability, and principals and agents are rand...

Advancing upon taxonomical research on interfirm alliances, we investigate the design of entrepreneurial firms’ alliances in more fine-grained terms by focusing on the specific contractual provisions that firms negotiate into their alliance contracts. Drawing upon transaction cost arguments, we examine the determinants of the contractual complexity of collaborative agreements in the German tele...

It has recently been argued by a number of writers that the evolutionary theory of the firm is a genuine theoretical rival to the contractual theory of the firm. This paper presents a reconstruction of the evolutionary theory of the firm. A taxonomy developed by the Polish philosopher Krajewski is then utilized for the purpose of the discussing the relations between the evolutionary and the con...

This Essay argues that the “psychological contract”—the parties’ respective, subjective, idiosyncratic understandings of their contractual obligations to one another—is important and predictable. The common law of contract tells us how to discern the legal promise. By contrast, the “psychological contract” describes how the parties themselves understand their agreements, an inquiry that refers ...

This study investigates the role of information technologies (IT) in the governance of IT outsourcing relationships. Managers rely on contractual and relational governance to manage IT outsourcing projects. In addition, they use dedicated IT solutions to make the governance more efficient. While the role of IT in supporting the two governance approaches is appreciated in practice, it has not ye...

This paper describes the Contract Expression Language (CEL), currently being developed at the industry consortium Content Reference Forum. The CEL is an XMLbased language designed to express contractual agreements between different parties for the purposes of capturing and communicating contractual information, and facilitating contract execution and enforcement by machines with respect to gran...

We investigate the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with explicit contractual devices. We show that full collusion can be achieved by incentivizing the players’ final period of play with small fines. Our incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if (and only if) he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. We show that using this contractua...

This paper proposes a novel approach that draws upon the existing architecture and contractual relationships and compares the approach to the main existing techniques for securing BGP against prefix hijacking. We define prefix hijacking as usurping control of IP prefixes through the manipulation of BGP routing tables resulting in a redirection of network traffic away from a correct route to a p...