Abstract Many philosophers think that common sense knowledge survives sophisticated philosophical proofs against it. Recently, however, Bryan Frances (‘Philosophical sense’ 2021) has advanced a proof he thinks cannot survive. Exploiting paradoxes like the Sorites, attempts to show how leads paradox and therefore methodology is unstable. In this paper, we Frances’s fails then present with dilemma.

In what follows I have merely tried to state, one by one, some of the most important points in which my philosophical position differs from positions which have been taken up by some other philosophers. It may be that the points which I have had room to mention are not really the most important, and possibly some of them may be points as to which no philosopher has ever really differed from me....

We describe a hierarchical learning approach for effective coordination in repeated games based on a commonsense decomposition of the “coordination problem”. In contrast to most other research on mechanism design and game-learning, we concentrate on breaking down the top-level problem into simpler learning tasks concerned with learning (i) utility functions, (ii) best-response strategies and (i...

Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the “fundamental attribution error”. If this is right, then philosophers cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such thing as character. Thi...