In this paper I defend the importance of Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” for Philosophical Posthumanism vis-à-vis humanism. After first establishing role intentionality in humanism, move to a critique that from perspective both ontology and history scientific explanation. Rendering deeply problematic thereby acting support Posthumanism, argue may ultimately be too strong itself. This is b...

The contemporary discussion on the subjective character of conscious experience is characterized by a stark contrast between higher-order intentionalism, according to which any state awareness depends instantiation intentional properties mental states, and anti-intentionalism, inner constitutive fundamentally different from ordinary instances external or introspective awareness, in that one’s n...

Abstract Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis (†1323) share a correlational theory of intentionality. When I cognize thing, am in real relation with the thing cognized at same time is reason me. coins term “intentionality” to designate precisely this reason. First second intentionality express two stages relation. refers that has mind, while indicates qua mind. Thus, first involves direct cognit...

Computer systems designed explicitly to exhibit human-like intentionality (seeming to be about and directed toward the world) represent a phenomenon of increasing cultural importance. In the discourse about arti!cial intelligence (AI) systems, system intentionality is often seen as a technical property of a program, resulting from its underlying algorithms and knowledge engineering. By contrast...

Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world. Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is...

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action's intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people's intentionality judgments. His and other researchers' studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when th...

The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in...

I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.