The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s...

In this paper, we argue that the bulk of EU budget spending can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers. Using such estimates, we compare incumbent member states' predicted budget receipts before and after eastern enlargement, and examine the impact of different voting rules in EU-27. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effe...

We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measu...

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating...

We report high photovoltaic performance of a novel donor-acceptor (D-A) conjugated polymer poly[2,6[4,8-bis(2-ethyl-hexyl)benzo[1,2-b;4,5-b']dithiophene-co-2,5-thiophene-co-4,7[5,6-bis-octyloxy-benzo[1,2,5]thiadiazole]-co-2,5-thiophene] (PBDTTBTZT) in bulk heterojunctions with [6,6]-phenyl-C71-butyric acid methyl ester (PC70BM). A power conversion efficiency (PCE) of more than 7% is obtained fo...

This paper shows a new axiomatization of the Shapley value by using two axioms. First axiom is Dummy Player Property and second axiom is Strong Addition Invariance. Strong Addition Invariance states that the payoff vector of a game does not change even if we add some specific games to the game. By slightly changing the definition of Strong Addition Invariance, we can also axiomatize the weighte...

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in the input pro…le. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input, not all of them should receive a bigger share of output. We show ...

This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The axioms single out the projection rule among the rules that depend on the current partition and the pessimistic rule among the ones that are independent of the current partition. This analysis suggests that the projecti...

We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at ea...

We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the co...