Depuis les prévisions d’Adorno et Horkheimer à propos de la Kulturindustrie, dimension idéologique l’art est étroitement pensée articulée aux conditions matérielles sa production diffusion. La tâche des artistes résiderait ainsi dans recherche d’un style, compris non plus comme un travail du fond forme interne l’objet d’art, mais positionnement spécifique face industries culturelles : celui rés...

The authors modify the price-setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition, 2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Their results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always selec...

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, princip...

In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future periods, and consumers who observe price under-cutting may correctly anticipate an ensuing price war and the...

We study a Bertrand game where two sellers supplying products of different and unverifiable qualities can outwit potential clients through their (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize a class of pooling equilibria where sellers post the same price regardless of their quality and low quality ones deceive buyers. Although in these equilibria low quality goods are purchased with positive ...

In this paper, we study the influence of QoS pricing strategy in the future QoS Internet market. We create a Bertrand duopoly game model with different pricing schemes: One ISP with flat rate pricing for its QoS service and the other ISP with two part tariff, a combined pricing scheme with flat rate and usage-sensitive pricing. Based on industry survey data, we conduct a simulation of a random ...

This paper investigates the equilibrium investment policies of two different firms under customers’ preferences uncertainty. The incumbent firm, which owns a superior old technology, produces merchandise that can satisfy current customers at the beginning of the investment game. The startup firm, which possesses an inferior old technology, does not capture the customers’ satisfaction but it has...

We introduce a notion of variational convergence for sequences of games and we show that the Nash equilibrium map is upper semi-continuous with respect to variationally converging sequences. We then show that for a game G with discontinuous payoff, some of the most important existence results of Dasgupta and Maskin, Simon, and Reny are based on constructing approximating sequences of games that...

Consider a Bertrand model in which each rm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active rms is uncertain. This activity level can be endogenized in any of several ways{ as whether to incur a xed cost of activity, as output choice, or as quality choice. Our model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry pro ts are positive and decline with the number of rms, the s...

Since at least Engle (1982) and Stock and Watson (2002), we know that the conditional variance of future output and inflation evolves over time. However, in these seminal contributions, the risk of real activity and inflation is implicitly considered as symmetric. In this paper, we investigate the time evolution of the conditional distribution of macroeconomics variables with a special interest...