Academics and other researchers regularly engage in strategic interactions— bargaining, cooperation, collaboration, etc. Given this strategic setting, we ask: how do the dynamics of social learning in epistemic communities influence outcomes of various actors? We focus, in particular, on minority groups in academia. As we show, evolutionary game theoretic models indicate that such actors may be...

For over a decade, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) concept from cooperative game theory has been used in networks as a concept that allows sharing resources fairly. Due to its many appealing properties, it has recently been used for assigning bandwidth in a general topology network between applications that have linear utilities. In this paper, we use this concept for the bandwidth allocatio...

This paper derives the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for two-player games where each player has the option of postponing bargaining till a future period. This option endogenously determines the threat points of the initial game. The outcome is compared with the case where there is no such option, and with the usual Rubinstein bargaining game where one offer per period is made. JEL Classi...

Non-cooperative game theory predicts that Allocators in Ultimatum games will take almost all the 'cake'. Experimental evidence is in sharp contrast with this prediction, as several experiments show that the modal offer is the even split. Interpretations of such results usually make reference to two competing explanations. One invokes the notion of fairness; the second argues that in the absence...

This paper considers the “negotiation game” (Busch and Wen [4]) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria some of which involve delay in agreement and inefficiency. In order to isolate equilibria in this game, we explicitly consider the complexi...

We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bargaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) under a plausible parameter restriction. This solution is simple, micro-founded and permits a transparent analysis of the driving forces of wages. We argue that it can be used in a wide range of economic models incorporating the search and matching theory of unemployment to ...

We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, we can find a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. For...