The Network Design problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering almost exclusively networks designed by selfish users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network design issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among users. Both the Nash barg...

I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend ...

For repeated ultimatum bargaining, the Folk Theorem of repeated game theory suggests that there are many equilibria, among them equilibria in which the second mover, say, the buyer, appropriates all the surplus. This paper shows that the presence of outside options in form of alternative trading partners eliminates some of these equilibria by reducing the cope for extracting surplus in repeated...

service oriented enterprises (soes) are subject to constant change and variation. in this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. we construct a game theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflicting i...

We explore different ways to generalize Hintikka’s classic game theoretic semantic to a many-valued setting, where the unit interval is taken as the set of truth values. In this manner a plethora of characterizations of Lukasiewicz logic arise. Among the described semantic games is Giles’s dialogue and betting game, presented in a manner that makes the relation to Hintikka’s game more transpare...