This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution to the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of " matching pennies " provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a...

We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterization of extensive form rationalizability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalizable if and only if there is a state in which ...

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

A backward analysis of integration methods, whose numerical solution is a P-series, is presented. Such methods include Runge-Kutta methods, partitioned Runge-Kutta methods and Nystrr om methods. It is shown that the numerical solution can formally be interpreted as the exact solution of a perturbed diierential system whose right-hand side is again a P-series. The main result of this article is ...

: Wherever the United Nations has its Problems, or relief teams are needed, here will be Swedes ready to help and Capable of holding responsible posts. 1 was particularly interested to see now such a country, with its social customs in many ways difTerent from ?Urs, and with a highly developed s?cial welfare system, approached its Problem of caring for mentally handiCapped children. during my s...

Following Kohlberg-Mertens [8, 1986], we investigate an axiomatic approach to non-cooperative solution concepts. A basic question in this program is identifying a backward-induction axiom (for general games). We show that three axioms—Existence, Rationality, and Difference—together characterize backward induction in perfect-information games satisfying a “single payoff condition.” We discuss im...

Researchers commonly use species-area relationships (SAR) to estimate extinction rates caused by habitat loss by reversing the SAR, extrapolating backward from area to calculate expected species loss. We have previously shown that the backward SAR method considerably overestimates extinction rates due to a previously unrecognized sampling artifact. Jacob Bock Axelsen, Uri Roll, Lewi Stone, and ...