We consider Nonlinear Equilibrium (NE) for the optimal allocation of limited resources. The NE is a generalization of Walras-Wald equilibrium, which is equivalent to J. Nash equilibrium in n-person concave games. Finding NE is equivalent to solving a variational inequality (VI) with a monotone and smooth operator on Ω = R+ ⊗ R+ . Projection on Ω is a very simple procedure; therefore, our main f...

IN those delightful writings which Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace bas brought together in the volumes entitled Studies Scien#ji& lind Sodal and which include, with discussions geological, biological and anthropological, other discussions that are economic, political and educational, the reader finds a chapter described by the headline, "The Problem of Utility." Naturally, if he is familiar with mod...

The challenge of Karl Polanyi. Journal of European Economic History 6: 703–16 Schmoller G 1904 Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre. Teil 2. Duncker und Humblot, Leipzig Swedberg R 1994 Markets as social structures. In: Smelser N J, Swedberg R (eds.) The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 255–82 Vanberg V J 1982 Markt und Organisation. J. C...

In this paper we suggest a new framework for constructing mathematical models of market activity. Contrary to the majority of the classical economical models (e.g. ArrowDebreu, Walras, etc.), we get a characterization of general equilibrium of the market as a saddle point in a convex-concave game. This feature significantly simplifies the proof of existence theorems and construction of the adju...

It is shown that the distribution of agents’ characteristics is a concise and accurate description of an economy as far as Walrasian equilibrium analysis for large economies is concerned: Let 8 be an exchange economy; W(8), the set of Walras allocations for 8; and g?(8), the set of distributions on the commodity space of the allocations in W(8). It is shown that for two atomless economies 8, an...

In this paper, we have extended previously known human migration models and realized a series of numerical experiments on a model example to simulate the influence of the marginal migration costs, utility function values and the influence coefficients on the equilibrium states. The introduced influence coefficients allow one to consider and study not only the two classical models by Walras (per...

1.1. The first model of general economic equilibrium was presented by Walras [15] more than hundred years ago. As the model became generally known, it must have been clçar that it was desirable to generalize it, and take uncertainty into account. The most visible markets at the end of the last century were probably the stock exchanges, where uncertainty obviously played an important part. Insur...

where xij(p) is the optimum allocation of good i to agent j under the price vector p and wij is the j’s endowment of good i. Last lecture, we showed that f(p) has the following two properties: • Homogeneity (H): f(αp) = f(p), ∀α > 0 • Walras Law (W): p f(p) = 0 In this lecture, we introduce a dynamic process for updating the price vector which converges to the equilibrium price for all excess d...