We introduce a new traffic analysis attack: the Two-sided Statistical Disclosure Attack, that tries to uncover the receivers of messages sent through an anonymizing network supporting anonymous replies. We provide an abstract model of an anonymity system with users that reply to messages. Based on this model, we propose a linear approximation describing the likely receivers of sent messages. Us...

The (two-sided) Mullins-Sekerka model is a nonlocal evolution model for closed hypersurfaces, which was originally proposed as a model for phase transitions of materials of negligible specific heat. Under this evolution the propagating interfaces maintain the enclosed volume while the area of the interfaces decreases. We will show by means of an example that the Mullins-Sekerka flow does not pr...

The investigation of human placental nutrient transfer and hormonal secretion presents a particular challenge because these processes depend on the intactness and orientation of the unicellular epithelial sheet of villous syncytiotrophoblast that mediates them. The isolated perfused placental cotyledon retains the architecture of the villi and has been very useful, but the presence of the non-t...

Given that one-sided hypothesis tests are more powerful than their two-sided counterparts, model selection procedures that employ one-sided information should outperform those that do not. In the frequentist area of econometrics, perhaps the most popular model selection procedures are those based on estimates of the Kullback-Leibler information, Akaike’s (1973) Information Criterion (AIC) being...

This paper considers a dynamical system, which models a two-sided market. I evaluate the volume of users from each side of the market as a function of time. I formulate and prove theorems describing the long-term behavior and tendency of the market. Even though I consider generic attachment functions, I obtain a concrete result, formulated in terms of properties of attachment functions. I concl...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its pro t stream in a continuous-time in nite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platf...

Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm...

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via “platforms,” where one group’s benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform; and a model of “competitive bottlenecks” where one group joins all platforms. The ...