This paper investigates whether proximity to institutional shareholders influences corporate policies. We find that firms with high local institutional ownership are more profitable, less risky, and have a better governance structure. Specifically, these firms are less likely to engage in undesirable corporate activities such as aggressive earnings management or option back-dating and are there...

Economic analysis and evidence indicate the market for corporate control is benefiting shareholders, society, and the corporate form of organization. The value of transactions in this market ran at a record rate of about $180 billion per year in 1985 and 1986--47 percent above the 1984 record of $122 billion. The number of transactions with purchase prices exceeding one billion dollars was 27 o...

In this paper we show, in an incomplete contracts framework that combines asymmetric information and moral hazard, that by permitting insiders to trade on personal account the equilibrium level of output can be increased and shareholder welfare can be improved. There are two reasons for this. First, insider trading impounds information regarding the costs and benefits of effort and perk consump...

This paper analyzes the determinants of the differential pricing of equity classes (the so-called dual-class premium [DCP]) in Brazil from 1995 to 2006 with a focus on two specific corporate governance aspects: i) the granting of tag along rights, a mandatory bid rule that extends to minority shareholders the right to sell their shares in case of a control transfer; and ii) the identity of the ...

the purpose of business entity is to maximize shareholders wealth by enhancing the firm’s value thus, getting expected returns are very important for them. investors and creditors are going to find a precise scale for measuring overall performance of a firm as a whole to decide whether to invest in the firm, to continue with the firm or to exit from it. economic value added (eva) is an analytic...

This paper explores whether DICTION text analysis software reveals distinctive language markers of a verbal tone of hubris in annual letters to shareholders signed by CEOs of major companies. We analyze 193 letters to shareholders, comprising about 368,000 words, focusing initially on 23 letters signed by CEOs who are alleged to be hubristic: Browne (BP), Goodwin (Royal Bank of Scotland) and Mu...

In this article, we study the potential for digital, online information and electronic voting to improve shareholder surplus by facilitating a new governance structure, owner-governance, which shifts control of the takeover decision from the board to shareholders. We compare analytical models of owner-governance to the current practice of delegatedgovernance in the context of increasing availab...

Risk shifting is a well-known agency problem in corporate finance which also exists between policyholders and shareholders of insurance companies. Shareholders engage in excessive risk taking at the expense of policyholders who, in turn, are less willing to pay for insurance coverage. Solvency regulation addresses this incentive problem by restricting the set of investment strategies and premiu...

We analyze the determinants of ownership structure in firms when conflicts of interest on risk arise endogenously via different ownership stakes and firm decisions are made through majority voting. A large block is chosen to incentivize monitoring. Because a large blockholder holds a large share of the firm, he is averse to risky investing. This generates a conflict of interest with dispersed s...

Mutual fund providers serve two principals with opposing interests: their owners, who want them to maximize profits, and their fund shareholders, who want them to maximize fund returns. I investigate what role is played by customer power and information, as well as by competition among fund providers in influencing the balance of power between these two opposing principals. Using a data set of ...