In this work we examine power measures used in the analysis of voting games to quantify power. We consider both weighted and non-weighted voting games giving simple examples of each. The power indices considered are the Shapley-Shubik [8] index, the Banzho index [1], the Penrose [7] index and Coleman [2] indices. We apply them to speci c examples taken from recent Canadian parliaments and to th...

A standard empirical finding is that expected changes in exchange rates and interest rate differentials across countries are negatively related, implying that uncovered interest rate parity is violated in the data. This article provides new empirical evidence that suggests that violations of uncovered interest rate parity, and its economic implications, depend on the sign of the interest rate d...

n Abstract: In this paper we analyze two natural convexity definitions for cooperative bankruptcy games, one of them was introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). In particular, we show that convexity in the sense of increasing marginal contributions is not satisfied by the game introduced by these authors. Furthermore, we propose an alternative game that captures the situation of bankruptcy pr...

Our work aims to study a model based on an extended variant of the stable fixtures problem where multiple matches can be established between pairs of players, moreover preference orders are subject to alteration due to player strategies.

The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, 2000), we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic c...

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the agg...

Biodiversity is well studied in ecology and the concept has been developed to include traits of species, rather than solely taxonomy, to better reflect the functional diversity of a system. The deep sea provides a natural environmental gradient within which to study changes in different diversity metrics, but traits of deep-sea fish are not widely known, hampering the application of functional ...

In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j’s utility when matched with i. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C78

We suggest a new game-theory-based ranking method for wines, in which the Shapley Value of each wine is computed, and wines are ranked according to their Shapley Values. Judges should find it simpler to use, since they are not required to rank order or grade all the wines, but merely to choose the group of those that they find meritorious. Our ranking method is based on the set of reasonable ax...

Using techniques from the non-standard analysis, a non-standard analogue of the AumannShapley random order value of non-atomic games is provided. The paper introduces the notion of effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups. It is shown that for a wide class of games, the non-standard random order value with respect to an effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups coincides with t...